Deciding whether to buy new information to potentially improve the residual reserves of a producing oilfield, and what price to pay for the information, which may or may not actually improve the reserves picture, is a problem of some concern to field development and production economics. Here we show how the worth of obtaining new information depends not only on the reserves produced to date but also on the residual reserves still to be produced, on the probability that purchase of new information will indeed improve the known reserves, on the value estimated to be produced by the acquisition, and on the cost of the acquisition. There are also dependencies on production and lifting costs but these are not considered in detail here. The timing of a decision whether to acquire new data and how much to pay for it, are illustrated using total profitable gains made to date as a proxy for time. Two simple examples are worked through in detail so that one can see when the uncertainty of possible gains from newly acquired information are sufficient, relative to costs and the worth of residual reserves still to be produced, to allow management to make an informed and rational decision on whether to acquire and when to acquire new information in respect of the life of the field without such acquisition.
I. INTRODUCTION
The first two papers in this series (Lerche and Noeth, 2002a,b) considered the effect of acquiring new information on profitability of a producing field when it was not clear whether the acquired information would improve the chances of increasing oil production, or decrease the oil production, or whether, even with an increase expected in the total producible oil, the cost of the acquired information could be so large as to offset completely any new oil found. The uncertainty inherent in such estimates was handled using Crystal Ball, a program that allows one to vary uncertain parameters and determine which parameters are causing the greatest uncertainty in predictions of any desired output -such as total profitability versus acquisition costs for instance. But what was not handled in those first two papers was an estimate of whether it made any sense at all to acquire new information in relation to the amount of oil already produced, i.e. an estimate of when in the life cycle of the oil field one should consider new information acquisition. The purpose of this paper in the series is to show how that problem can be addressed.
The basic sense of the argument is relatively simply stated, although the technical execution is considerably more complex. Suppose a known oil field has producible reserves of R bbl. To date one has produced X bbls, leaving R-X bbls to be produced in the future. At a fixed price per bbl, one knows with some precision how much the residual oil will bring, and one also knows with some precision how much one has in the bank as a consequence of the oil produced to date being sold. If one suspects that there are further parts of the reservoir that need better clarification before one can book as certain any putative reserves they contain, then one has to spend money on data acquisition to enable such clarification to be achieved. Such new information may show zero reserves, some small amount, or an economical oil pool. One does not know which eventuality will obtain. Clearly then, spending too much on the data acquisition is not warranted because such can drain the future cash flow from the known (but unproduced) reserves, or can drain the cash reserve one has banked to date, or both. In addition, if one spends money on data acquisition too early in the life of the field, then one has little money in the bank to pay for the acquisition and one must mortgage the future field earnings to pay for the acquisition costs, and if the interpretation of the newly acquired data shows zero new potential reserves one can end up producing a field and getting no return at all for the corporation if the acquisition costs are too high.
Equally, waiting to decide on acquiring new information until the known reserves are all produced is also not a terribly good idea even though one has then the maximum cash in the bank. The reason here is that most of the wells on the field will be almost at their completion limit and, should new data show an undiscovered section of the field with producible reserves, then one must again gear up to either set production wells or perform sidetrack wells. Each such endeavour costs money and a corporation is usually loath to take their cash on hand and again commit it to an almost exhausted field in the hope of further production. There is a further problem here. The price of oil is not only not fixed but, with inflation, a fixed numerical price for oil translates into a lower, fixed year, dollar price for any new reserves; a corporation would then not obtain as much profit as they would have done had they started earlier to acquire new information and used it for earlier new oil production at a higher, fixed year, dollar amount.
There must then be an appropriate time range in the life of a field at which new information acquisition maximizes the chances of returning the highest profit. This time range must depend on the total known producible oil reserves, the inflation rate, the costs of the new data, and the probability any new data will lead to enhanced producible reserves. And, because these values are not carved in stone, each having a range of possible values (such as future inflation rate for example), then each will bring a degree of uncertainty to precisely how the best time range varies and also the range of anticipated profit. A concern to a corporation is to assess which parameters are causing the greatest uncertainty and how then one can come to grips with what to do, when to do it, how much it will cost, and any potential profit increase. This general problem is considered here.
II. QUANTITATIVE PROCEDURES
The main procedure for deriving quantitative measures of worth for the problem is contained in the general decision-tree diagram (figure 1) and the corresponding Microsoft Excel program that allows a direct link to Crystal Ball, and which has been described in detail in the first two papers in this series (Lerche and Noeth, 2002a,b) . Accordingly we can be brief and discuss only those aspects of the Microsoft Excel program relevant for this paper. Our interest here is not in the situation where acquisition of the data is inconclusive and further tests are required (that situation will be discussed in the next paper in the series). Rather we concentrate on the situation where newly acquired data do resolve the unknown situation -but it may be either a positive or a negative resolution as depicted in Figure 1 .
To provide some simple examples of how one can decide on when to acquire new information, and at what price the new information is worth acquiring (if at all), we consider here two illustrations tailored to sharply indicate some of the problems and pitfalls associated with making decisions on field development. The first illustration considers that all probabilities remain fixed as given by the values in Table 1 , with only the future worth of the field and also the cost of new acquisition being allowed to vary. In this way one can see how the probability of increased success is dependent on total estimated field worth versus varying costs of acquisition. The second illustration freezes the costs of acquisition and also the estimated field worth, but allows the probability of new data improving the worth of the field to vary so one can see the risk associated in considering commitment. The element of time is considered as measured by the total production of the field in the absence of the new data acquisition commitment. Thus at a fixed production rate per year (and a fixed price per bbl with no inflation) one can quickly convert to clock time through the cumulative bbls produced and price per bbl. 
Fixed Probabilities, Variable Worth and Costs
In this example we consider that both the amount earned to date from the field and also the amount that could be earned in the future are variable but that the sum is constant, thereby representing different phases in field development without the addition of new acquisition. It is the constant sum worth that we allow to be variable. We also allow the costs of new information acquisition to vary so that, for the fixed probability values for each decision-tree branch, one can see precisely when (or whether) it makes sense Table 1 to acquire new information at particular cost values in relation to total field worth without the new acquisition costs. The total fixed potential of the field is taken to be $150MM so that one can vary the amount of future gains from $0 to $150MM and, at the same time, lower the gains to date so that the sum is always $150MM. All other parameters and probabilities are kept fixed except for the costs of acquiring new information, which is allowed to vary between $1MM, $10MM, and $100MM. For each of the three values of costs of acquiring information, we plot the expected future worth of the field with the acquisition versus the remaining potential worth of the field without acquisition. We also plot the probability that the worth of the field with acquisition will be higher than the worth without undertaking the acquisition. The three groups of results are shown on figures 2, 3 and 4 respectively. Because the estimated benefit of acquiring new data is taken to be $90MM in Table 1 , with a 70% chance the new information will indeed deliver such a worth, then for low costs of additional information, there comes a point in the estimated residual worth of the field when it indeed makes sense to invest in the new data acquisition because one has extracted most of the known worth of the field in the absence of further information. Inspection of figures 2 and 3 shows that the "cross-over" point (where the probability exceeds 50% that the worth with acquisition will exceed the residual worth without acquisition) is after one has successfully extracted about $100-120MM of the anticipated $150MM without new information. Figure 2 . Plot of both the probability that the NPV (net present value) with acquisition will exceed the residual NPV without acquisition, and of the NPV with acquisition, as functions of the residual worth that could be extracted from the field if no acquisition were to be undertaken. The cost of acquisition is set at $1.0MM, and the probability of success for the acquisition at 70%, and the potential gains from acquisition information at $90MM 
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Cost of acquisition=$1.0MM Figure 3 . Plot of both the probability that the NPV (net present value) with acquisition will exceed the residual NPV without acquisition, and of the NPV with acquisition, as functions of the residual worth that could be extracted from the field if no acquisition were to be undertaken. The cost of acquisition is set at $10MM, and the probability of success for the acquisition at 70%, and the potential gains from acquisition information at $90MM . Plot of both the probability that the NPV (net present value) with acquisition will exceed the residual NPV without acquisition, and of the NPV with acquisition, as functions of the residual worth that could be extracted from the field if no acquisition were to be undertaken. The cost of acquisition is set at $100MM, and the probability of success for the acquisition at 70%, and the potential gains from acquisition information at $90MM As the cost of the acquisition rises, and we use a cost of $100MM to illustrate the ultimate limit, there comes a point where the new acquisition costs will outstrip the estimated new worth such acquisition will bring to the field. There is then no way such an acquisition could be successful. This limit is indicated in figure 4 . Thus, in every situation there is a limit as to how much one should pay for acquisition of new information in respect of the anticipated benefits such an acquisition may deliver (and remembering that there is only a 70% probability of such success for the numerical values of Table 1 ). The ultimate aim is to maximize potential field worth. So the best strategy is to wait until one has sufficient production worth that the amount still to produce is less than the costs of new information plus the anticipated worth such information will bring to the field. It then makes sense to risk the remaining potential gains from the field on the costs of acquisition so that one can provide a most likely maximum potential worth for the field. Figures 2, 3 and 4 have been tailored to show this involvement most clearly.
A. Variable Probability, Fixed Potential Worth and Variable Costs
The second example used to illustrate the influence of uncertainty on acquisition decisions is to take a situation (again with a total of $150MM in the absence of new information) and fix the gains to date at $120MM so that there remains $30MM in the absence of further information. The potential gains with new information are kept fixed at $90MM as for the first illustration, and the two factors of estimated success probability of the acquisition and also the cost of acquisition are allowed to vary. In this way one can see at a given stage of field development whether it makes any sense to acquire new information (and at what price) in relation to continuing the field development without the acquisition. One could then repeat the procedure for different values of produced wealth to see if it ever makes sense to acquire and what the success probability should be in order to set an informed decision into play. Here we use only the fixed value of $120MM produced worth (with $30MM still to be obtained without information acquisition) to show the way such problems are most easily handled. Basically one varies the probability of success for the acquisition situation together with the cost of acquisition and so produces curves for the probability the gains to be made with acquisition expenditure will exceed residual gains without acquisition, and also the NPV ($MM) of the anticipated acquisition situation in comparison to the $30MM still to be made if one were not to acquire new information. Figures 5, 6 and 7 show such situations for the three cases of acquisition costs of $1MM, $10MM and $50MM respectively, drawn as functions of the estimated probability that the case of acquisition will indeed yield the $90MM shown in Table 1 .
As in the previous example one notes now that as the probability of success is raised so too there is a greater chance that the acquisition will be more bountiful in terms of profit making than the situation without acquiring new information. But, at a given value of success probability, as the costs of acquiring new information rise, then the probability of a profit exceeding the situation of carrying on with production without acquiring new information diminishes. Thus again, depending on the range of uncertainty one ascribes to the probability of a success with acquisition information, and depending on the price one pays for the acquisition in relation to the residual profit Figure 5 . Plot of both the probability that the NPV with acquisition will exceed the residual NPV without acquisition, and of the NPV with acquisition, as functions of the estimated success probability that the acquisition will uncover gains of $90MM. The cost of acquisition is set at $1.0MM and the already extracted worth of the field is taken to be $120MM with another $30MM still to be extracted if no acquisition is undertaken 
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Cost of Acquisition= $1.0MM Figure 6 . Plot of both the probability that the NPV with acquisition will exceed the residual NPV without acquisition, and of the NPV with acquisition, as functions of the estimated success probability that the acquisition will uncover gains of $90MM. The cost of acquisition is set at $10MM and the already extracted worth of the field is taken to be $120MM with another $30MM still to be extracted if no acquisition is undertaken still to be made without acquisition, there is a time to buy the information, a time to not buy, and a time to decide whether one wishes to buy information. While the simple example given here has been carried through for just the one case of $120MM already gained with another $30MM still to go, one can immediately see that by carrying this sort of calculation through at each stage of development of the field one can determine at any given time what is the best strategy to follow. To convert to "real" time then demands that some idea is to hand of the price of product in relation to the amount of product still to be produced. For this reason we have chosen to work directly with dollars earned to date and dollars still to be earned as a direct substitute for time.
Estimated Probability of Success
Conversion of one to the other is simple once a dollar price per future bbl can be assessed, as has been remarked already in the Introduction to this paper.
III. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The main aim of this paper has been to show how one can make rational decisions concerning the acquisition of new information for an oil field when the field is partially depleted. The new information one can obtain costs money and so diminishes the worth of the field if one were not to acquire the information. On the positive side the acquisition can enhance the worth of the field by providing new information on potential reserves not previously known. The competition is between the probability that any new data will indeed provide a significant new reserve component, the estimated worth of the new component, the cost of the information, and the worth of Figure 7. Plot of both the probability that the NPV with acquisition will exceed the residual NPV without acquisition, and of the NPV with acquisition, as functions of the estimated success probability that the acquisition will uncover gains of $90MM. The cost of acquisition is set at $50MM and the already extracted worth of the field is taken to be $120MM, with another $30MM still to be extracted if no acquisition is undertaken 
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proceeding with field development ignoring any possible new information. There is clearly an accumulation of money necessary from the field before one has enough in the bank to afford the costs of new information. There is also a need to decide whether any new information will, most probably, provide a sufficient new worth that it makes sense (in terms of maximizing potential total field gains) to go ahead with acquisition or whether it is better to continue as is with the field development in terms of the already proven reserves. Because there is uncertainty on the amount of worth any new information is likely to produce, one needs to take into account the uncertainty on any potential estimated new reserves. The two examples given here have been designed to show how one goes about estimating whether it is worthwhile going ahead with new data acquisition and when, in terms of accumulated worth as the measure of time. Many other illustrations could also be given of course, but the two chosen show extreme end-member behaviours that cleanly indicate how one goes about making objective rational estimates of the worth of proceeding with new information acquisition in a developing and producing oilfield.
